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COMMENTS
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN OBSCENITY CASES
By TERRY D. Ross*
EXPERT testimony is a common and significant form of evidence
in obscenity cases, although it is difficult to generalize upon its use
since there is a wide divergence among courts as to the extent to
which such testimony is admissible and necessary. It is the purpose of
this comment to examine the proper role for the expert in obscenity
cases. The conception of "obscenity" defines that role since it deter-
mines that to which the expert may testify. The first task, then, is to
draw some conclusion as to what "obscenity" connotes in terms of sub-
stantive law.'
ROTH AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS
The United States Supreme Court in Roth v. United States2 held
that obscenity is not constitutionally protected expression. By salvaging
and integrating past statements bearing on the topic the Court formu-
lated a new test for determining if challenged material is actually
obscene: "[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest."3 Any apparent clarity or simplicity
is deceptive: the test is riddled with ambiguity and hidden meaning.
Its significance is revealed only by considering the elements and other
*Member, Second Year Class.
The word "obscenity" has never had a precise or generally accepted definition
legally, as every case and comment regarding it indicates. See, e.g., Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957). See generally, Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Litera-
ture, 52 HAXv. L. REv. 40 (1938); Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Ob-
scenity, and the Constitution, 38 Mnai. L. BEv. 295 (1954).
2 354 U.S. 476 (1957). This was actually two cases consolidated, the second being
Alberts v. California. Each tested the constitutionality of an anti-obscenity statute:
Roth that of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1948); Alberts that of CAL. PEN. CODE § 311.
a 354 U.S. at 489. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)
(formerly § 207.10 of Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957) where a similar definition of obscenity
is given: "Obscene defined . . . .A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its
predominant appeal is to prurient interest . . .. See generally Schwartz, Morals
Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 669 (1963). CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 311 also similarly defines obscenity. This is discussed in Baum, Californids New Law
on Obscene Matter, 36 CALin. S.B.J. 625 (1961); Selected 1960-1961 California Legis-
lation, 36 CAiw. S.B.J. 643, 795 (1961); Wilson, Californids New Obscenity Statute:
The Meaning of "Obscene" and the Problem of Scienter, 36 So. CAL. L. REv. 513, 523
(1963).
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language of the Roth case, against the background of earlier cases and
statements on obscenity and through the perspective afforded by the
post-Roth decisions.4
"Whether to the Average Person the Dominant Theme of the Material
Taken as a Whole Appeals to Prurient Interest"
This portion of the Roth test imports first, that the appeal (or
effect) of the material must be measured with reference not to the
most susceptible possible recipient, but rather with reference to the
person with normal sex instincts.5 This requirement has been adjusted
recently to cover cases where the material is directed at a deviate or
juvenile audience; the reference is now to the average person in the
"intended and probable recipient group."6
Secondly, the "dominant theme of the material taken as a whole"
must be considered. Courts, therefore, are not at liberty to determine
4 See generally, Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing
Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960). This is generally regarded as the
leading legal article in the field of obscenity.
The Roth case can be said to be a general re-affirmation of a stance in opposition
to the Hicklin test, which was: "[W]hether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." The Queen
v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360. As originally accepted in the United States, it was inter-
preted to stand for three propositions: the material's effect could be determined with
reference to the most susceptible possible recipient, the effect of any isolated passage
br portion could be the basis of determination, and the social worth of the material had
no bearing whatever on the question of obscenity. See United States v. Kennerley, 209
Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). With the decline of the moralistic influence of Anthony
Comstock, the test fell into disrepute and was abandoned in the 1930's. See Alpert,
supra note 1, at 65. To appreciate its erosion chronologically, see United States v. Den-
nett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930); United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F.
Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd sub nom. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses,
72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
5See United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," supra note 4, at 184.
8 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-509 (1966). Lockhart & McClure, supra
note 4, at 68, formulate and expound the "variable obscenity concept" which is what the
court in Mishkin appears to have adopted, i.e. a determination based upon the appeal
to (or effect on) the average member of the particular audience to which the material
is directed.
Notice that this approach allows distribution to doctors, educators, and scientists
of material which might be held obscene if distributed to the average man, and distribu-
tion to an average man of material which might be held obscene if distributed to a
child. See United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Cf.
People v. Marler, 199 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 889, 18 Cal. Rptr. 923 (App. Dep't Super. Ct.
San Bernardino, 1962). It is highly probable, then, that no special statutes are necessary
to protect children, since the Mishkin rationale provides an automatic gauge. Some,
however, have suggested methods more directly aimed at protecting youth. See, e.g.,
Dibble, Obscenity: A State Quarantine to Protect Children, 39 So. CAL. L. REV. 345
(1966); Note, 54 GEo. L.J. 1379 (1966), for discussion'of the advantages of this approach
and the problems involved.
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the appeal (or effect) of the material by limiting their consideration
to isolated passages or portions, but are obligated to find that the ob-
jectionable parts are of such quantity or nature as to flavor the whole.7
Third, and most importantly, the material must appeal to prurient
interest.8 The Court borrowed the phrase from the Model Penal Code,
wherein it is defined as a "shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex,
or excretion .... " Although, in the Model Penal Code the American
Law Institute expressly rejected the definitions of obscenity developed
by case law,10 the Supreme Court could perceive "no significant differ-
ence between the meaning of obscenity developed in the case law
and the definition of the A.L.I. Model Penal Code ... ."" The Court
proceeded to approve the case law definitions given in the instructions
by the trial courts in the respective cases: in Alberts that the material
"has a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers" and in
Roth that it "has a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." 2 Analyzing
these facts, Lockhart and McClure, the leading legal writers in the
field, conclude that the Court may consider any of the three definitions
constitutionally acceptable.1 It is true, however, that there is a strong
tendency of courts, at least nominally, to accept the Model Penal Code
definition.
"Applying Contemporary Community Standards"
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kennerley 4 made refer-
ence to obscenity as the "present critical point in the compromise
between candor and shame at which the community may have ar-
rived here and now." 5 The Court in Roth by requiring application of
contemporary community standards was restating Hand's basic notion
that material which is generally tolerated by the people in the com-
7 See, e.g., Maryland State Bd. of Motion Picture Censors v. Times Film Corp.,
212 Md. 454, 129 A.2d 833 (1957). Courts occasionally recognize that the "dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole" has different implications with regard to the
medium of expression. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1964); Landau
v. Fording, 245 A.C.A. 872, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1966).
8 See generally, Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitu-
tional Issue-What is ObsceneP, 7 UTAH L. REv. 289 (1961).
In addition to the appearance of the phrase in the Roth test itself the Court also
stated: "[Slex and obscenity are not synonomous. Obscene material is material which
deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
9 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
10 MODEL PErAL CODE § 207.10, comment 6(a) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
11354 U.S. at 487 n.20.
12354 U.S. at 486-90. In his separate opinion Mr. Justice Harlan points to the fact
that the majority in Roth was actually approving very different definitions. Id. at 496-500.
13Lockhart & McClure, supra note 4, at 56-58.
14209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
15 Id. at 121.
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munity is not obscene. Stated differently in later cases, obscene ma-
terial must exceed "the customary limits of candor;"' 6 it must exhibit
"patent offensiveness." 7 In Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,' Mr.
Justice Harlan indicated that the determination that the material
affronts contemporary community standards of decency is a separate
constitutional prerequisite to the conclusion that it is obscene.' 9
There has been much controversy as to whether the community
referred to is a local or national one.20 It has been argued that the
standard is similar to that of the reasonable man in negligence cases
and exists without regard to any geographical area.2' Some cases have
held that the relevant community is the state;22 a smaller minority
that it is the city.23 Most courts, however, have chosen the national
community as the standard,24 thus following the opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan in Manual Enterprises, and that of Mr. Justice Brennan in
Jacobellis v. Ohio25 -neither of which was a majority opinion.26
"Utterly Without Redeeming Social Importance"
Apart from the elements of the Roth formula per se, the Court in
Roth indicated that social importance would continue to play a role in
the determination of obscenity,27 but did so ambiguously. The con-
troversy has centered around whether social importance should merely
16 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
17 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
18 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
19 Id. at 482.
20 Compare the principal opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), with
the dissenting opinion of Warren, C.J., id. at 199.
21 See generally, Seaton, Obscenity: The Search for a Standard, 13 KAN. L. REV.
117 (1964).
22 See, e.g., McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545
(1963); Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1140, 1182-86 (1966).
23 See, e.g., Gent v. State, 393 S.W.2d 219 (Ark. 1965), prob. juris. noted as to
part, cert, denied as to part, 384 U.S. 937 (1966); Note, 20 Arm. L. REv. 178 (1966).
24 See, e.g., State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 147, 196 A.2d 225 (1963);
Excellent Publications, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 362 (1st Cir. 1962) (dictum).
25378 U.S. 184 (1964).
26 Moreover, Justice Harlan's reasoning in the Manual Enterprises case, that one who
violates the federal anti-obscenity statutes might be tried anywhere in the nation and
therefore a national standard should be used, is no reason for requiring states to do so,
since the trial will be within the state.
The California statute (CAL. PEN. CoDE § 311) buries the problem by deleting the
word "community." This tactic implicitly recognizes the elusiveness of "contemporary
community standards," but achieves no real advantage.
2
7 It was stated: "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion-have the full protection of the guarantees, unless excludable because they en-
croach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of
the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance." (Footnote omitted.) 354 U.S. at 484.
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be weighed along with the other elements of the test, or whether it
should be an independently applied constitutional criterion. The am-
biguous reference in Roth can easily be interpreted to support either
of those viewpoints.28 While definitive settlement remains for the
Court, "probabilistic importance"29 is given to the opinion of Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fortas, in
A Book Named "John Clelanrs Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General,0 in which it was stated: "Each of the... constitu-
tional criteria is to be applied independently; the social value of the
book can neither be weighed against nor cancelled by its prurient
appeal or patent offensiveness." 31
The Ginzburg Gloss
In Ginzburg v. United States, 2 a majority of the Supreme Court
seemed to suggest that even though the content of the material might
not be obscene under the Roth test, a conviction for the violation of
an obscenity statute could be upheld where the evidence showed that
the defendant had economically exploited, or "pandered," the material
by putting sole emphasis on the sexually provocative aspects.3 3 The
2 8 E.g., compare the respective opinions of the justices in A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
29 See Church-State-Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey, 1964-66,
41 NoTRa DA-hm LAw. 681, 776 (1966).
30 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
31Id. at 419. (Footnote omitted.) This was established as the rule in California in
the case of Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 383 P.2d 152, cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
Courts have yet to consider the question whether the very fact that the material
appeals to prurient interest might give that material social importance. This will become
a very real problem if it is shown that the partaking of obscene matter provides an outlet
for drives which would otherwise result in some sort of asocial conduct-such as sex
crimes. Douglas, J., suggested this possibility in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 432 (1966) (concurring
opinion) when he stated: "[O]ne might guess that literature of the most pornographic
sort would ...provide a substitute-not a stimulus-for anti-social sexual conduct."
See generally, Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. Ra,. 655, 661 (1964).
32383 U.S. 463 (1966). The Ginzburg decision is noted in 19 STAr. L. REv. 167
(1966); 44 TEx. L. Rav. 1382 (1966).
33 Id. at 470. See MODEL PEArL CODE § 207.10 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957): "Alter-
native (1) Pandering to Interest in Obscenity Prohibited .... Pandering means exploit-
ing such an interest primarily for pecuniary gain, knowing that the interest 'exploited
is an interest in obscenity for its own sake ... " Undoubtedly, the Court drew upon
this language for the holding in Ginzburg. The Model Penal Code discarded this provi-
sion as an alternative basis in the 1962 Proposed Official Draft, but reaches the same
result by providing in § 251.4(2) (e) that one who "sells, advertises or otherwise com-
mercially disseminates material, whether or not obscene, by representing or suggesting
that it is obscene," is guilty of a misdemeanor. CAL. PEN. CODE § 311.5 prohibits the
advertisement of material held out to be obscene.
Perhaps this may be considered as another dimension within the framework of Lock-
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Court seems to speak estoppel without saying it; that is, it refuses to
recognize the defendant's contention that the content of the material
which he represented as obscene (by means of advertisements de-
signed to "catch the prurient") is actually not. 5
It has been suggested that the pandering basis of determining guilt
in a criminal obscenity case may become the tail that wags the dog.36
To the degree that it does, the prime consideration of this comment,
i.e. expert testimony in obscenity cases, will be of decreased signifi-
cance since the court will shift its inquiry from the nature of the
content of the material to the facts of the defendant's conduct. How-
ever, the Court in Ginzburg expressly limited the application of the
pandering basis of guilt to "close cases, "37 and so long as this limitation
remains expert testimony will continue to be appropriate to establish
that there* is a close case. It is highly improbable that the Court will
extend the application beyond close cases, since to do so would be
to accomplish a substantial piece of legislation.38
hart and McClure's "variable obscenity concept"-tbat is, variable with regard to the
defendant's conduct. See note 6 supra.
34383 U.S. at 473. Here the Court is quoting with approval from the opinion of
Learned Hand in United States v. Rebhuln, 109 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir. 1940).
85 383 U.S. at 472. Here it was stated that "The court could accept [the panderer's]
evaluation at face value."
36 See Church-State-Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey-1964-66,
41 Norms DAw LAw. 681, 771 (1966). The contrary conclusion is suggested in Ablard,
Obscenity, Advertising, and Publishing: The Impact of Ginzburg and Mishkin, 41 GEo.
WAs r. L. REv. 85 (1966).
87383 U.S. at 474. A "close case" is one in which the material which is represented
as obscene is at least borderline; that is, if it does not appeal to prurient interest, exceed
contemporary community standards, or lack social importance, it comes very close to
doing so with respect to the element or elements that it does not meet.
3 
It is believed that the Court in Ginzburg has cautiously and commendably pointed
the way to a new means of regulating objectionable materials. Although the Court in
Ginzburg justifiably accomplished some judicial legislation, any further extension of this
approach should come from the legislative rather than the judicial branch of government.
It was stated in Ginzburg that "A conviction... explained in part by the presence
of this [pandering] element, does not necessarily suppress the materials in question, nor
chill their proper distribution for a proper use." 383 U.S. at 475. This approach, then,
does not permit wholesale censorship; in fact, it assures the minimum infringement on
freedom of expression while allowing society its right to control morality by regulating
conduct regarded as detrimental to its interests. The fact that emphasis is put on the
defendant's conduct rather than on the content of the material tends to bring obscenity
law into line with other criminal law, and recognizes, as did Mr. Chief Justice Warren in
his concurring opinion in Roth, that "It is not the book on trial, it is the person." 354
U.S. 476, 495 (1957).
The Ginzburg rationale presents two especially interesting suggestions. First, al-
though the Court refused to apply the pandering basis to other than "close cases," because
it seems evident that convictions based on pandering do not infringe on free speech, legis-
latures could extend the rationale to cover any case where the defendant by his conduct,




Now that some foundation in the substantive law of obscenity has
been established-however much it may rest upon quicksand-the
expert's proper place and purpose in obscenity cases may be considered.
The vagueness of "obscenity" is fully recognized, both as a pre-
scriptive standard for criminal conduct and as definitive of expression
which is not constitutionally protected. 9 The opposite results reached
in different courts as to the obscenity of the very same material
testify to this vagueness." Like justice Stewart, everyone knows it
when he sees it.4 ' However, each person, having a different perspective,
sees it in a different place. The Supreme Court, however, has un-
equivocally held that the vagueness of "obscenity" is constitutionally
tolerable. 2 It is not the purpose of this comment to attempt to assail
that holding. Rather, within the bounds of that holding, the expert
will be presented as one who has the potential of reducing the ad-
mitted vagueness by providing evidence which bears upon whether or
not the challenged material is obscene according to an accurate ap-
plication of the elements of the obscenity test.
Basis for Allowing Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases
As a matter of common law, parties are entitled to call upon ex-
pert witnesses to testify in a proper case.43 Statutes also often authorize
where the defendant has represented material as obscene in his advertisements of it, that
material will usually suffice to make a close case. The advantage to be gained by a statute
punishing simple pandering of obscene material is that there would be no need to prove
the close case. Second, the present undesirable and burdensome procedural difficulties
involved in obscenity cases which are determined by application of the Roth test to the
content of the material may be overcome. There have been two main difficulties in this
respect, both of which stem from the problem that the question of the obscene nature
of the material's content is held to be a mixed question of law and fact, or a "constitu-
tional-fact question." This holding means that: (a) the judge of the trial court is required
to make an independent finding and dismiss the case if he concludes that the material
is not obscene regardless of what the jury might find; and (b) on appeal review de novo
is required. See 5 A.L.R.3d 1158, 1190-94 (1966), and cases cited therein.
It is believed that preservation of morality is the basic motivation behind anti-
obscenity laws (even though it is not a proven result). Therefore, a commendable quality
of the Ginzburg approach is that it is particularly aimed to insulate those who are not
already aware of how and where to obtain the potentially corrupting material, i.e. those
who are most likely to have morals remaining to protect.
a9 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
40 Compare Attorney General v. The Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass.
11, 184 N.E.2d 328 (1962) (Tropic of Cancer not obscene), with People v. Fritch, 13
N.Y.2d 119, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1, 192 N.E.2d 713 (1963) (Tropic of Cancer obscene).4
1 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion).
42 354 U.S. 476, 491. The Court stated that this "lack of precision is not itself of-
fensive to requirements of due process."
43 See generally, McComacx, EvmENcE, §§ 11-17 (1954). 7 WIeMorx, EvENuCE
§§ 1917-29 (3d ed. 1943); WrraN, CALIFouwA EvmFNcE, §§ 406-439 (2d ed. 1966).
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the use of expert testimony.4 4 The Model Penal Code specifically pro-
vides, "Expert testimony . . . relating to factors entering into the
determination of the issue of obscenity, shall be admissible.""
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Smith v. California,48 main-
tained that whether it is a judge or jury hearing the case, he "would
make the right to introduce such evidence [expert testimony] a re-
quirement of due process in obscenity prosecutions."47 The other
extreme is illustrated by Judge Learned Hand's position, that in each
case it should be the jury which establishes the standard and moreover
that it is "especially the organ with which to feel the content.. ,,.'
of allegedly obscene material. It is nowgenerally agreed that an ex-
pert's testimony upon a matter is not an usurpation of the function of
the jury," because such testimony is merely evidence which the juror
is to weigh along with other evidence, i.e. the expert's testimony is
not and should not be conclusively binding.49 Recognizing this fact,
there is ample room for both Frankfurter's view that expert testimony
should be admitted upon the factors of determination, and Hands
view that the jury should ultimately decide whether material is or is
not obscene.
In accordance with the general rules of evidence, expert testimony
should be admitted in obscenity cases where the two recognized pre-
requisites are met: a proper subject and a qualified witness.5 The
test is: "Can a jury from this person receive appreciable help . .
which "will probably aid [it] ... in its search for the truth?"5"
At the threshold of consideration of proper subjects for expert
testimony in obscenity cases, it is to be conceded that an expert should
never be asked directly, "Is this matter obscene?"53 The former ra-
44 See, e.g., CAL. EvroENCE CODE §§ 720-23. Of., FED. B. Cnvm. P. 28. Many stat-
utes, moreover, authorize the court, on its own prerogative, to call an expert witness. See,
e.g., CAL. Evmzcz CODE §§ 730-33. This last procedure is understandably more con-
ducive to obtaining unbiased experts, and if utilized could therefore solve one of the
recurring problems of expert testimony.
4
6 MODEL PE AL CODE, § 251.4(4) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
46361 U.S. 147, 160 (1959).
47 Id. at 167.
48 United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
49 See 7 WrcmonE, EVIDENcE § 1920 (3d ed. 1940). This rule is frequently stated
in obscenity cases. See, e.g., United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855, 859-60
(6th Cir. 1986).
50 See 7 WIGMopE, EvIENcE § 1920 (3d ed. 1940).
51 People v. Williamson, 207 Cal. App. 2d 839, 847, 24 Cal. Rptr. 734, 739 (1962),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 994, rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 871 (1964). In this obscenity case
the California court stated it was adopting Wigmore's criteria and cited 7 WGMOnE,
EvoENcE § 1923 (3d ed. 1940).
52 State v. Killeen, 79 N.H. 201, 107 At. 601 (1919). Cited with approval in 7
WiGmoRE, EVmIENcE § 1923, at 22 (3d ed. 1940).
53 See, e.g., United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855, 859 (6th Cir.
1966).
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tionale was that this is the ultimate question and to allow an expert
to testify upon it would be an invasion of the province of the jury."
This strict rule is now generally rejected, 5 but McCormick states there
is a distinction to be made between questions "merely call[ing] for
an opinion as to an ultimate fact.., and those which have the addi-
tional feature that they are expressed in terms of some legal standard
... ."' Obscenity is in this respect similar to negligence; it is a con-
clusion which is expressed in terms of a legal standard, aptly called
by McCormick a "legal conclusion."'57 Expert testimony is not proper
as to this type of ultimate question. The fact that there is no expert
in determining obscene matter is a second important reason for ex-
cluding expert testimony on the question.
Potential subjects for expert testimony in obscenity cases are de-
termined by the elements of the obscenity test. The Supreme Court
has done little to enlighten lower courts as to which of these elements
expert testimony might be proper. 8
"Whether to the Average Person the Dominant Theme of the Material
Taken as a Whole Appeals to Prurient Interest"
The "dominant theme of the material taken as a whole" means
that the objectionable parts must be of such quantity or nature as to
flavor the whole. 9 The producer's purpose is not equivalent to the
dominant theme. The former is irrelevant on the question of whether
or not, as a fact, the content of the material is obscene.60 The dominant
54 See Note, 12 DE PA UL L. REv. 337, 339 (1966).
55 Id. at 339-40.
5 McCommcK, EVmENC E § 12, at 27 (1954).
57 Id. at 28. See Note, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 113.
58 Statements coming from the Supreme Court which more than passively take notice
of the fact that expert testimony was or was not admitted are limited to Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160 (1959), (see note
46 supra and accompanying text), and that of Justice Harlan, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in Smith v. California, supra at 169, where he stated that he thought
it would be a denial of due process to exclude all evidence bearing on contemporary
community standards, but that it would not be a denial of due process to exclude only
expert testimony. As the court in United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp.
171, 183 (W.D. Mich. 1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966) recognized: "The cases
which have discussed the issue of expert witnesses in obscenity cases present at best a
dim beacon for . .. guidance."
59 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
60 See United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
The purpose of the purveyor is an entirely different consideration from the purpose
of the producer. The Supreme Court held in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959),
that the purveyor must have scienter of the nature of the material, but the exact defini-
tion of this requirement has yet to be made clear. And under the Ginzburg basis of con-
viction the purveyor's purpose as revealed by his conduct has a direct bearing on his
guilt. It is, however, the producer's purpose being discussed in the text, and it is without
relevance on the obscene nature of the content of the material, except as it manifests itself
in the finished product.
COMMENTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
theme imports an aspect of the final product. As so defined it would
be a proper subject for expert testimony since there are qualified ex-
perts in the various media who can give jurors appreciable aid in
determining the dominant theme of a particular work. The courts,
however, seldom so articulate this issue, probably for the reason that
it is implicitly determined by the expert's testifying to the work's
social importance.
While there is a discernible trend toward allowing testimony of
qualified experts as to the material's appeal to prurient interest, there
is a lack of consensus in the reasoning of the federal"- and state 2
courts. This lack of uniformity indicates basic confusion.
In order to determine whether or not expert testimony should be
admitted on the issue of appeal to prurient interest, that concept must
be carefully analyzed. As mentioned above, the Court in Roth was
unable to distinguish between the Model Penal Code's requirement
that the material have a certain appeal, and the case law definitions
61 See United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965) (expert testimony neces-
sary to establish prurient appeal to deviates; autoptical evidence insuffcient); Volansld
v. United States, 246 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1957) (expert testimony concerning effect on
juveniles and deviates error; average man is standard); Parmelee v. United States, 113
F.2d 729, 732' (D.C. Cir. 1940) (dictum) (psychologists' testimony desirable if not
necessary); United States v. 392 Copies of a Magazine Entitled "Exclusive," 253 F. Supp.
485 (D. Md. 1966) (expert testimony desirable or necessary where deviates involved;
where average man only necessary if material is "esoteric," not if "elemental"); United
States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film IEntitled "491," 247 F. Supp. 450
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (expert testimony necessary concerning prurient appeal to average man
-in civil and criminal cases); United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171
(W.D. Mich. 1964) (approved exclusion of expert testimony on ultimate issue of obscen-
ity; ignored exclusion on appeal to prurient interest). In United States v. Davis, 353
F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 953 (1966), Waterman, J., dissenting,
stated that he did not feel that the verdict could be sustained without expert testimony
on the issue of appeal to prurient interest.
62 See State v. Onorato, 3 Conn. Cir. 438, 216 A.2d 859 (1965) (dictum) (expert
testimony admissible but not required on appeal to prurient interest). State v. Scope, 46
Del. 519, 86 A.2d 154 (Super. Ct. 1952) (psychologist could testify concerning effect
on subconscious; should not concerning effect on conscious). Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp.
v. State Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 98, 213 A.2d 235 (1965) (burden of proof not sus-
tained because no expert testimony on appeal to prurient interest); accord, Dunn v. State
Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 249, 213 A.2d 751 (1965). Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182
A.2d 798 (1962) (disallowance of expert testimony on lack of prurient appeal is error);
accord, Levine v. Moreland, 229 Md. 231, 182 A.2d 484 (1962) (dictum). State v.
Jungclaus, 176 Neb. 641, 126 N.W.2d 858 (1964) (expert testimony on appeal to pruri-
ent interest admissible); G. P. Putnam's Sons v. Calissi, 86 N.J. Super. 82, 205 A.2d
913 (Ch. 1964) (judge arbitrarily stated prurient appeal not subject to documentary
evidence). State ex rel. Beil v. Mahoning Valley Distrib. Agency, Inc., 116 Ohio App.
57, 186 N.E.2d 631 (1962) (witnesses must qualify as experts to testify concerning
prurient appeal). City of Cincinatti v. King, 107 Ohio App. 453, 8 Ohio Op. 2d 82, 159
N.E.2d 767 (1958) (expert testimony on appeal to prurient interest of average man
sufficient to sustain conviction).
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calling for a certain effect. The confusion injected thereby has been
perpetuated by similar indiscriminate use of language by lower courts.
Thus, while nearly all post-Roth cases verbally accept the definition
requiring an appeal to "a morbid or shameful interest in nudity, sex
or excretion," they continue to speak also of "corrupting or depraving
morals," and "exciting lustful thoughts." Because appeal to prurient
interest is the primary issue in obscenity cases,63 and since any one
definition of it is vague enough standing alone, courts are to be en-
couraged to make clear their choice or choices of definition, and to be
discouraged from confusing the definitions and thereby compounding
the problems.
It is assumed that courts generally intend to apply the Model Penal
Code definition affirmatively set forth in Roth since nearly all adopt
it verbally. The question then is whether or not the subject of the
material's appeal to a morbid or shameful interest in nudity, sex or
excretion is a proper one on which to admit expert testimony. The
Model Penal Code has attempted to clarify the requirement that the
material appeal to a morbid and shameful interest in nudity, sex or
excretion. Implicitly recognizing that there may exist a legitimate
interest as well as a morbid or shameful interest in nudity, sex or
excretion,"4 it provided that "the guilt-pleasure concept.., is central
to [the] . . . definition of prurient interest." 5 While "guilt-pleasure
concept' may leave something to be desired, it provides the best
analytical tool yet proposed for determining whether or not there is an
appeal to prurient interest.
Distinction should be made between cases involving an intended
and probable recipient group of average persons and cases involving
an intended and probable recipient group of deviates or juveniles,
since it is to be expected that the type of material which will appeal
to the prurient interest of the average member of each such group will
differ. But it is submitted that in either case expert testimony should
be admissible.
If the target group is one of persons having average sex instincts,
it has been argued that the jury assessment of the material's appeal
to prurient interest should be made without expert aid, since the jury
is as capable as any expert of recognizing a morbid or shameful interest
in nudity, sex or excretion which would cause the guilt-pleasure syn-
drome central to the Model Penal Code definition.6 Deeper analysis,
63 See Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional Issue-
What is Obscene?, 7 UTA L. REV. 289 (1961).
64 See Note, 51 CoRNL. L.Q. 785, 789 (1966).
65See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, comment (d), at 32 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1957). LaBarre, Obscenity: An Anthropological Appraisal, 20 LAw & Co=Mr:MP. PRoB.
533 (1955), is cited therein as support for this proposition.
66 See Note, 51 ComuqErL L.Q. 785, 789 (1966).
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however, points to the fact that while laymen might be able to rec-
ognize a morbid or shameful interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and
perhaps the guilt-pleasure syndrome, when they experience it, it is
doubtful that they could identify any given material which would
prompt such a manifestation without actually relying upon their own
reaction to the material. And this basis of decision is to be avoided since
considerable distortion will result from the facts that: (a) "no man can
qualify as an 'average man," '67 (b) the appeal of the material to the
juror while he is in court is bound to differ greatly from its appeal to
him under ordinary circumstances of observation; 8 and (c) there is
gross variation in the appeal of any given material based upon the
sex of the observer,69 and thus jurors of one sex have no foundation
whatever on which to determine the appeal of the questioned material
to members of the other sex. These considerations should cause doubt
as to the propriety of the suggestion that the juror alone is best able
to determine if the material appeals to prurient interest, as it is de-
fined by the Model Penal Code, and accepted in Roth. They strongly
suggest the need for expert testimony by one who has studied and has
knowledge of the reactions of average persons to various types of
material.
The argument in favor of admitting qualified expert testimony in
cases involving intended and probable recipient groups composed of
deviates or juveniles is even more compelling."0 Certainly no ordinary
juror has either a reactional or intellectual basis for determining what
sort of material appeals to the prurient interest-that is, a morbid or
shameful interest in nudity, sex or excretion-of non-average persbns,
which would cause these persons to experience the guilt-pleasure syn-
drome. Therefore, since jurors have no basis whatever for this de-
termination, expert testimony would be essential to provide them with
a basis.
71
6 7 State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 263 n.9, 196 A.2d 225, 233 n.9
(1963). (Emphasis in original.)
68 See Clark, The Projective Measurement of Experimentally Induced Levels of
Sexual Motivation, 12 J. Exp. PSYCHOLOGY 44 (1954). Clark's studies indicate there is a
gross difference in response to material based upon the extent to which the recipient en-
counters the material in a guilt-free situation.
69 See Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity
Laws and Empirical Evidence, 46 MmNN. L. REV. 1009 (1962), and the studies cited
therein.
70 See United States v. Ilaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965).
71 If instead of, or in addition to, the Model Penal Code definition, the court should
adopt one or both of the approved case law definitions, proper admission of expert testi-
mony similarly revolves around the criteria of a proper subject and a qualified witness.
Whether or not the material has a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt morals
might be a proper subject for expert testimony, except for the fatal fact that there are no
experts, since there is no empirical evidence which shows that the reading or observation
of obscene material causes any "deleterious influence on the character which in turn
manifests in behavior,"-the very reason (and a good one) for the Model Penal Codes
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In an obscenity case where the basis for prosecution is that set forth
in the recent Ginzburg decision, the expert's place has yet to be defined
by any court. As mentioned above, his importance will depend upon
whether close cases remain the breadth of the application of the pan-
dering rationale. Should the close case limitation remain, expert testi-
mony will continue to be important on the issues of contemporary
community standards and redeeming social importance to establish
the existence or absence of a close case. Should the close case limita-
tion be removed by decision or statute, expert testimony on these
issues will not be relevant. Upon the issue of appeal to prurient inter-
est of the content of the material, the admissibility of expert testimony
will similarly depend on whether or not the close case limitation re-
mains. However, anytime the Ginzburg rationale is applied, whether it
is applied only in close cases or is extended to all cases, the court will
be concerned with whether the defendant's conduct-his pandering-.
is making an appeal to the prurient interest of the average member of
the intended and probable recipient group. The psychological expert's
testimony, it seems, would be as useful here as it is with respect to
determining the nature of the content of the material.72 The only
notable differences appear to be: (a) due to the context of the Ginz-
burg-type of case the prurient interest requirement is necessarily de-
fined in terms of the recipient's shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex or excretion; and (b) the hypothetical question must be utilized
more often as a means of eliciting the expert's response since he will
be dealing with facts of the defendants conduct which he has not
observed rather than material which he has observed or read.
Experts who could qualify to testify as to whether the material ap-
peals to prurient interest as defined by the Model Penal Code would be
limited to those psychiatrists and psychologists who have studied
human reaction to various sorts of material. Their testimony should be
given with reference to the appeal to prurient interest of the average
members of the intended and probable group to which this particular
material was directed.7 Unless the expert has conducted-or is per-
rejection of the definition. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, comment 6(a) (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1957).
The last possible alternative or additional definition approved in Roth was that the
material have a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. It should suffice to say that while it
is arguable that an average juror could make this determination as to an intended and
probable recipient group of average persons by basing his determination upon his own
reactions, such a reactional basis for decision suffers from the same three infirmities given
in the text for opposing a reactional basis for deciding appeal to prurient interest as de-
fined by the Model Penal Code. Where the target group is composed of deviates or
juveniles, the jury would have no basis whatever to determine whether or not the ma-
terial would excite their lustful thoughts, and therefore an expert would be imperative.
72 Cf. People v. Sikora, 32 III. 2d 260, 204 N.E.2d 768 (1965) (evidence admissible
to show appeal to prurient interest by advertisements).
73 Cf., Volanski v. United States, 246 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1957).
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mitted to conduct-a study upon the very material in question, the
court should be convinced of the similarity between that which was
studied and that in question before allowing the expert to testify.
While it may be argued that these qualification requirements limit
the number of experts in any given case, such limitation is justified
since unless these requirements are met, the expert, like the juror, will
be without grounds for his opinion; his opinion would therefore be
superfluous and likely to mislead the jury.
Evidence on the material's appeal to prurient interest is of neces-
sity either autoptical, that is, presented for personal observation, or
expert testimony. 74 As observed above the trier of fact is 'not com-
petent to determine solely from autoptical evidence whether or not
material appeals to prurient interest. Therefore, it should be held that
there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict if the challenging
party fails to bolster his position with expert testimony,75 and error"
or denial of due process77 to refuse to allow the defendant's experts,
if qualified, to testify as to the material's lack of appeal to prurient
interest, except as the judge is authorized within his sound discretion
to limit their number.
"Applying Contemporary Community Standards"
Without instructive advice from the Supreme Court, the lower
courts have reached varying results regarding the expert's proper role
in determining contemporary community standards. The older cases
rejected expert testimony on this issue.78 Recent federal cases reveal
a tendency to permit qualified experts to give relevant testimony upon
the issue of contemporary community standards, 79 as do most state
court decisions.80
74 Cf., United States v. Kaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965).
75See Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. State Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 98, 213 A.2d 235
(1965). Cf., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1964), stating "the burden of
proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest with the censor."
76 See Yudldn v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962).
77 Cf., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
78 See, e.g., Drieser v. John Lane Co., 183 App. Div. 773, 171 N.Y. Supp. 605
(1918).
79 See Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859
(1962) (assumes expert testimony admissible on contemporary community standards, but
not required). Womqck v. United States, 294 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 859 (1961) (testimony inadmissible unless witnesses qualified as experts on con-
temporary community standards). Alexander v. United States, 271 F.2d 140 (8th Cir.
1959) (expert testimony on contemporary community standards admissible, but not
binding); accord, United States v. 392 Copies of a Magazine Entitled "Exclusive," 253
F. Supp. 485 (D. Md. 1966) (dictum). United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F.
Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich. 1964) (expert testimony rejected where expert's qualifications
not established).
80 Some state cases have indicated that it is a denial of due process to exclude expert
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Turning to general principles, is the issue of what exceeds con-
temporary community standards a proper subject for expert testimony?
The answer to this question has been complicated by confusion re-
garding the function of the jury in establishing contemporary com-
munity standards. In United States v. Levine,81 Judge Learned Hand
indicated that the jury should be treated as the embodiment of con-
temporary community standards by his statement that "the standard
[fixed by the jury] ... is likely to be an acceptable mesne ... ."82
However, the Supreme Court in Roth clearly indicated that the func-
tion of the jury is to determine rather than embody contemporary
community standards by its explicit approval of the trial judge's in-
struction that the jurors "are the ...judges of what the common
conscience of the community is, and in determining that conscience
[they] ... are to consider the community as a whole, young and old,
educated and uneducated, the religious and the irreligious-men,
women and children.""8 Since the Roth case the question of the scope
of the relevant community-local or national- has arisen, the majority
of jurisdictions applying the standards of the national community,
which is, of course, an abstraction based upon that geographical unit. 4
In the determination of contemporary community standards, the
trier of fact should consider all the evidence-including iexpert testi-
mony-bearing on the issue. Some courts, however, have insisted that
testimony on contemporary community standards, thus following Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160 (1959). In re Harris, 56 Cal.
2d 879, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305 (1961), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
374 U.S. 499 (1963); People v. Aday, 226 Cal. App. 520, 38 Cal. Rptr. 199, cert. de-
nied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964). One recent California case stated that expert testimony on
contemporary community standards is proper because it is a subject on which the judge
has no special competence. Landau v. Fording, 245 A.C.A. 872, 54 Cal. lRptr. 177
(1966). Other cases have indicated that expert testimony on contemporary community
standards is necessary to sustain the verdict. Leighton v. State Bd. of Censors, 242 Md.
705, 218 A.2d 179 (1966); Dunn v. State Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 249, 213 A.2d 751
(1965). It has been held error for the trial court to exclude expert testimony on this
issue. Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. State Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 98, 213 A.2d 235
(1965); Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962); Levine v. Moreland, 229
Md. 231, 182 A.2d 484 (1962); G. P. Putnam's Sons v. Calissi, 86 N.J. Super. 82, 205
A.2d 913 (Ch. 1964) (dictum). Other cases have admitted expert testimony on con-
temporary community standards, but have stated that such evidence would not be re-
quired to support a verdict. City of Chicago v. Kimmel, 31 Ill. 2d 202, 201 N.E.2d 386
(1964); City of Chicago v. Doe, 47 Ill. App. 2d 460, 197 N.E.2d 711 (1964); State v.
Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963) (dictum). A last group
of cases, bucking the trend, have held it proper to exclude expert testimony on con-
temporary community standards. State v. Vollmar, 389 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1965); People
v. Finkelstein, 11 N.Y.2d 300, 229 N.Y.S.2d 367, 183 N.E.2d 661 (1963).
8183 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
821d. at 157.
83 354 U.S. at 490.
81 See notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text.
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the jurors consult only their own experience. That reasoning overlooks
two facts: (a) that expertness is relative85 and that some persons have
greater familiarity with what the community tolerates and can en-
lighten the less informed jurors; and (b) that without any evidential
basis for determining contemporary community standards, a juror will
unconsciously be inclined mistakenly to think his own standards are
those generally held by the community and proceed to impose his
own standards rather than determine those of the community.86 This
approach of allowing expert testimony along with other relevant
evidence bearing on contemporary community standards does not deny
the "special aptitude" 87 of the jury to determine the "mesne,"88 but
rather it provides the jury with a more adequate basis for such deter-
mination.
Potential experts, because they could probably aid the jurors in
reaching an informed conclusion as to what are the communitys con-
temporary standards of candor and whether or not the challenged
material exceeds them, would particularly include sociologists. Also
those clergymen and social workers who associate extensively with
many segments of the community and are aware of the extent to which
questionable material is tolerated should be allowed to testify.89 Stu-
dents of American culture could be helpful, especially when the stan-
dard applied is a national one. Often having quantitative data to sup-
port their positions, distributors of material that is the same as or
similar to that challenged could likewise enlighten the jury as to what
the public does and does not tolerate in terms of its willingness to pur-
chase. Librarians are likely to have special knowledge which would
qualify them as experts. One writer suggests that "men learned in the
art"-such as critics, publishers, and professors as to written works,
and craftsmen, producers, and reviewers as to movies- because of
their closeness to and awareness of the public's acceptance of different
8 5 WrraN, CAx.roRNiA EVIDENCE, §§ 411 (2d ed. 1966).
86 See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, Su'. CT. REv. 1, 38-39
(1960).
87 See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 447 (1957) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
88 See United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
89 Clergymen are often admitted as experts on contemporary community standards;
see, e.g., People v. Williamson, 207 Cal. App. 2d 839, 24 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1962). Mr.
Stanley Fleishman, the defense attorney in that case, justifiably made the point that
ministers do not always associate with the community to the extent often assumed, and
additionally are often engaged in attempting to suppress material which offends their
church's standard. Letter from Mr. Stanley Fleishman to Terry Ross, October 21, 1966.
Thus, the judge should be particularly cautious in ascertaining that such a person does
qualify as an expert, and the jury should be instructed to consider and weigh such evi-
dence objectively.
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works in their respective media, would be helpful in determining the
issue.?
Some of these same persons could be potentially useful on yet
another plane in the determination of whether or not the material
challenged exceeds contemporary community standards. It is not un-
common for the parties in an obscenity case to bring into evidence
material alleged to be similar to that challenged 91-the defendant to
establish that this type of material is commonly tolerated by the com-
munity, and the prosecutor or plaintiff to show that this similar ma-
terial has been adjudged obscene, and thus necessarily in excess of
contemporary community standards, in the same or another jurisdiction.
It would seem that testimony of the "men learned in the art" could be
profitably considered by the jury in its determination of whether the
allegedly similar material is actually similar. A sensible position was
taken in United States v. West Coast News Co.,92 where the judge held
that allegedly similar material was admissible only if a qualified expert
established its substantial acceptance in the community and its similar-
ity to the challenged material.9
It should be held error or denial of due process where the trial court
judge excludes qualified expert testimony or material established as
similar. 4 Where the community used as the standard is a national one,
as it will be in most cases, the prosecution or plaintiff should be re-
quired to submit evidence in addition to the material itself (e.g., expert
testimony, similar material adjudicated to be obscene elsewhere) re-
garding contemporary community standards, in order to sustain its
burden of proof. This requirement is necessary because it is doubtful
that jurors from a given locality have any idea of what the national
community standard is. However, if a local community standard is
used, while such additional evidence as expert testimony would be
desirable, it should not be required to support a verdict since jurors
of the locality fairly can be assumed to have some basis for their
determination in their personal knowledge.
"Utterly Without Redeeming Social Importance"
Most cases now allow experts to testify as to the social importance
of a challenged work95 despite the Supreme Court's failure to shed
80 Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. BEv. 834,
853 (194).
91 See, e.g., United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich.
1964).
92 228 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mich. 1964).
93 Id. at 195.
94 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160 (Frankfirter, J., concurring); id. at 169
(Harlan, J., separate opinion). Accord, cases cited note 80 supra.
95 See, e.g., Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962).
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authoritative light on the question. With the probability great that
courts will treat utter lack of social importance as a separate and in-
dependent requirement and not just as one factor to be balanced with
the other elements of the Roth test,"0 defendants can be expected
nearly invariably to attempt to justify their material on the ground that
it has some social importance, and to call upon experts in the process.
The propriety of admitting such testimony cannot be questioned since
it is certain that there are specialists in the fields of art, literature, and
science who could give aid to almost any juror or judge in determining
the worthiness of works in their respective fields. 7 It seems justifiable
to repeat here again, though, that merely because an expert has testi-
fied that a work has artistic or literary value, and thus supposedly has
redeeming social importance, the trier is not bound by that opinion. It
is his task to weigh all the evidence, including the expert testimony,
and weigh it with regard to his belief in its relevancy and veracity.
Certainly, the juror's capacity to determine the question of the mater-
ial's social importance will be no less than before he heard the ex-
perts testify, even if the testimony of different experts conflicts. Fail-
ure to admit testimony of the defendant's qualified expert should be
held to constitute prejudicial error, but since even in the absence
of expert testimony jurors will have grounds in personal experience
for judging the material's social importance, the prosecution or plaintiff
should not be required to submit expert testimony to support a fa-
vorable verdict.
CONCLUSION
The law of obscenity hovers on one side of a "dim and uncertain"""
line which separates it from the basic freedoms of expression guar-
anteed and protected by the first amendment. It calls for regulation
based upon essentially subjective determinations. The Supreme Court
Justices, to achieve even limited consensus of opinion among them-
selves and to conceal the fact of the inherent impossibility of precisely
and objectively defining "obscenity," have cast a judicial fog over
it. That fog has naturally extended to cover the question of the expert's
role in adjudicating the obscene. Lower courts, left without guidance
in independently and usually hastily determining the admissibility
of expert evidence, have on occasion failed to give due consideration
and articulation to the problem before them.
An attempt has been made to examine closely the elements in-
volved in the adjudication of obscenity, and to,/address some of the
semantical difficulties involved, in an effort to delineate the proper
place and purpose of the expert in an obscenity case. It is not suggested
96 See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
9 7 See generally Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1063 (1964).
98 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
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that the admission of expert testimony is a panacea for all the problems
posed by the judicial determination of what is obscene. It is only sub-
mitted that such testimony when properly focused and reasonably
controlled by the trial court's prudent exercise of judicial discretion-
such as limiting the number of experts who may testify and requiring
proof of their qualifications as an expert on the matter at hand-will
yield results embedded with more informed considerations and will
help to insure that the test of obscenity is met in a literal way. In this
manner, some degree of certainty might be injected into an otherwise
vague field of law.

